
bitcoinproblems.org/problems/ptlc-cycle-jamming.html
Preview meta tags from the bitcoinproblems.org website.
Linked Hostnames
7- 4 links togithub.com
- 2 links tobitcoinops.org
- 2 links toeprint.iacr.org
- 2 links totwitter.com
- 1 link tobitcoinproblems.org
- 1 link toen.wikipedia.org
- 1 link tolists.launchpad.net
Search Engine Appearance
PTLC Cycle Jamming
In Point Time Locked Contract (PTLC) based Lightning channels the lock is randomized at each hop so that two malicious nodes separated by at least one honest node in a payment path cannot use the lock to determine whether the PTLCs are part of the same payment. Unfortunately, this seems to make PTLCs a little bit too unlinkable – it allows a malicious sender to create a single payment that cycles multiple times through a target pair of honest nodes significantly reducing the capacity between them for a small cost to the attacker. As in an ordinary jamming attack the malicious receiver then refuses to unlock the payment leaving the funds locked along the path until timeout. The honest nodes cannot detect the attack for the same reason that it preserves privacy: each incoming PTLC cannot be linked to any previous one.
Bing
PTLC Cycle Jamming
In Point Time Locked Contract (PTLC) based Lightning channels the lock is randomized at each hop so that two malicious nodes separated by at least one honest node in a payment path cannot use the lock to determine whether the PTLCs are part of the same payment. Unfortunately, this seems to make PTLCs a little bit too unlinkable – it allows a malicious sender to create a single payment that cycles multiple times through a target pair of honest nodes significantly reducing the capacity between them for a small cost to the attacker. As in an ordinary jamming attack the malicious receiver then refuses to unlock the payment leaving the funds locked along the path until timeout. The honest nodes cannot detect the attack for the same reason that it preserves privacy: each incoming PTLC cannot be linked to any previous one.
DuckDuckGo
PTLC Cycle Jamming
In Point Time Locked Contract (PTLC) based Lightning channels the lock is randomized at each hop so that two malicious nodes separated by at least one honest node in a payment path cannot use the lock to determine whether the PTLCs are part of the same payment. Unfortunately, this seems to make PTLCs a little bit too unlinkable – it allows a malicious sender to create a single payment that cycles multiple times through a target pair of honest nodes significantly reducing the capacity between them for a small cost to the attacker. As in an ordinary jamming attack the malicious receiver then refuses to unlock the payment leaving the funds locked along the path until timeout. The honest nodes cannot detect the attack for the same reason that it preserves privacy: each incoming PTLC cannot be linked to any previous one.
General Meta Tags
8- titlePTLC Cycle Jamming | Bitcoin Problems
- charsetutf-8
- X-UA-CompatibleIE=edge
- generatorJekyll v3.9.2
- descriptionIn Point Time Locked Contract (PTLC) based Lightning channels the lock is randomized at each hop so that two malicious nodes separated by at least one honest node in a payment path cannot use the lock to determine whether the PTLCs are part of the same payment. Unfortunately, this seems to make PTLCs a little bit too unlinkable – it allows a malicious sender to create a single payment that cycles multiple times through a target pair of honest nodes significantly reducing the capacity between them for a small cost to the attacker. As in an ordinary jamming attack the malicious receiver then refuses to unlock the payment leaving the funds locked along the path until timeout. The honest nodes cannot detect the attack for the same reason that it preserves privacy: each incoming PTLC cannot be linked to any previous one.
Open Graph Meta Tags
6- og:titlePTLC Cycle Jamming
og:locale
en_US- og:descriptionIn Point Time Locked Contract (PTLC) based Lightning channels the lock is randomized at each hop so that two malicious nodes separated by at least one honest node in a payment path cannot use the lock to determine whether the PTLCs are part of the same payment. Unfortunately, this seems to make PTLCs a little bit too unlinkable – it allows a malicious sender to create a single payment that cycles multiple times through a target pair of honest nodes significantly reducing the capacity between them for a small cost to the attacker. As in an ordinary jamming attack the malicious receiver then refuses to unlock the payment leaving the funds locked along the path until timeout. The honest nodes cannot detect the attack for the same reason that it preserves privacy: each incoming PTLC cannot be linked to any previous one.
- og:urlhttps://bitcoin-problems.github.io/problems/ptlc-cycle-jamming.html
- og:site_nameBitcoin Problems
Twitter Meta Tags
1- twitter:cardsummary
Link Tags
3- canonicalhttps://bitcoin-problems.github.io/problems/ptlc-cycle-jamming.html
- stylesheet/assets/css/style.css?v=87fd84a136a73445e8313d77667ee061818e882e
- stylesheet/assets/css/custom.css?v=87fd84a136a73445e8313d77667ee061818e882e
Links
13- https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/htlc
- https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/ptlc
- https://bitcoinproblems.org
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lightning_Network
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/472.pdf