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https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-017-0917-2

How wishful seeing is not like wishful thinking - Philosophical Studies

On a traditional view of perceptual justification, perceptual experiences always provide prima facie justification for beliefs based on them. Against this



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How wishful seeing is not like wishful thinking - Philosophical Studies

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-017-0917-2

On a traditional view of perceptual justification, perceptual experiences always provide prima facie justification for beliefs based on them. Against this



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https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-017-0917-2

How wishful seeing is not like wishful thinking - Philosophical Studies

On a traditional view of perceptual justification, perceptual experiences always provide prima facie justification for beliefs based on them. Against this

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      How wishful seeing is not like wishful thinking - Philosophical Studies
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      On a traditional view of perceptual justification, perceptual experiences always provide prima facie justification for beliefs based on them. Against this view, Matthew McGrath and Susanna Siegel argue that if an experience is formed in an epistemically pernicious way then it is epistemically downgraded. They argue that "wishful seeing"—when a subject sees something because he wants to see it—is psychologically and normatively analogous to wishful thinking. They conclude that perception can lose its traditional justificatory power, and that our epistemic norms should govern how experiences are formed. To make this case, the downgrader must first isolate a feature of wishful thinking that makes it epistemically defective, then show that this feature is present in wishful seeing. I present a dilemma for the downgrader. There are two features of wishful thinking that could plausibly explain why it is irrational: the fact that a desire causes you to form a belief not supported by adequate evidence, or the mere influence that desire holds over belief formation. Each option presents formidable difficulties. Although the first “bad evidence” explanation, which McGrath employs, explains the irrationality of wishful thinking, it does not transfer to wishful seeing, since experiences are not formed in response to evidence. The second “influence of desire” explanation, which Siegel employs, fails to isolate an epistemically defective feature of wishful thinking, and also does not transfer to wishful seeing. I conclude that the downgrader’s argument from wishful seeing fails.

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